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Abstract—Autonomous robots are complex systems that re-
quire the interaction and cooperation between numerous het-
erogeneous software components. In recent times, robots are
being increasingly used for complex and safety-critical tasks,
such as exploring Mars and assisting/replacing humans. Con-
sequently, robots are becoming critical systems that must meet
safety properties, in particular, logical, temporal and real-time
constraints. To this end, we present an evolution of the LAAS
architecture for autonomous systems, in particular its GenoM
tool. This evolution relies on the BIP component-based design
framework, which has been successfully used in other domains
such as embedded systems. We show how we integrate BIP into
our existing methodology for developing the lowest (functional)
level of robots. Particularly, we discuss the componentization of
the functional level, the synthesis of an execution controller for it,
and how we verify whether the resulting functional level conforms
to properties such as deadlock-freedom. We also show through
experimentation that the verification is feasible and usable for
complex, real world robotic systems, and that the BIP-based
functional levels resulting from our new methodology are, despite
an overhead during execution, still practical on real world robotic
platforms. Our approach has been fully implemented in the
LAAS architecture, and the implementation has been used in
several experiments on a real robot.
I. INTRODUCTION
As robots are deployed for increasingly complex tasks,
the need increases for proving that these systems are safe,
dependable, and correct. This is particularly true for rovers
used in expensive and distant missions, such as Mars rovers,
that need to avoid equipment damage and minimize resource
usage, but also for robots that have to interact regularly and
in close contact with humans or other robots. Consequently,
it may soon become common to require software integrators
and developers to provide guarantees and formal proofs to
certification bodies that, for instance, a rover will not move
while it is communicating or even worse, while it is drilling,
that the navigation software has no fatal deadlock, or that the
arm of a service robot will not open its gripper while holding
an object.
A certain level of dependability and safety can be achieved
with thorough software testing and extensive simulation [1].
The goal of software testing is to “validate” and “verify” that
the software meets a given set of requirements, and the goal
of simulation is to detect errors as early as possible in the
design phase. Unfortunately, both simulation and testing have
the disadvantage of being incomplete, in the sense that each
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simulation run and each test evaluates the system only against
a small subset of the foreseeable set of operating conditions
and inputs. Hence, with complex autonomous and embedded
systems it is often impractical to use these techniques to cover
even a small fraction of the total operating space, not to
mention the high cost of building test harnesses.
In this paper, we make a significant step toward building
safe and dependable robotic systems. Robotic architectures
(e.g., the LAAS architecture [2]) are typically organized into
several levels, which usually correspond to different temporal
requirements or different levels of abstraction of functionality.
The lowest level of such architectures is the functional level,
which includes all the basic, built-in action and perception
capabilities such as image processing, obstacle avoidance, and
motion control. We propose a novel approach for developing
safe and dependable functional levels of complex, real-world
robots. With our approach one can provide guarantees that the
robot will not perform actions that may lead to states that are
deemed unsafe, possibly resulting in undesired or catastrophic
consequences.
Our solution relies on the integration of two state-of-the-art
technologies, namely:
• GenoM [2] – a tool (part of the LAAS architecture
toolbox) that is used for specifying and implementing
the functional level of robots; and
• BIP [3] – a software framework for formally modeling
complex, real-time component-based systems, with sup-
porting toolsets for, among other things, verifying such
systems, to guarantee correctness-by-construction (i.e.
that the system is guaranteed correct from the rigorous
design to implementation) to avoid as much as possible
a posteriori verification.
This integration allows us to synthesize for our robots (e.g.
Dala, an iRobot ATRV) a complete functional level that
is correct by construction. “correct by construction” in this
context, encompass the fact that all the basic specifications of a
GenoM module (e.g., requests that are incompatible or requests
for initialization) as well as the user-supplied (intra-module
or inter-module) specifications and safety constraints will be
enforced and formally guaranteed online by the underlying
BIP model and the resulting controller. With the inclusion
of such constraints, one can guarantee that the functional
level will not reach unsafe states, even if bugs exist in user-
supplied programs at higher levels of abstraction (e.g., the
decisional level). Moreover, the resulting BIP model can be
checked offline for properties such as deadlock-freedom using
verification tools and suites. Indeed, one needs to find the
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right balance between constraining the BIP model to enforce
properties on line, yet making sure it is deadlock-free to be
able to run the real system live.
A. State of the art
There are numerous works that address the architectural
aspect of robot software development (e.g., CLARATY [4]),
and software tools (e.g., OROCOS [5], CARMEN [6], Player
Stage [7], Microsoft Robotics Studio [8], and ROS [9]) to
develop the functional level of robotic systems. There is even
some work which compares them [10], [11]. Yet none of these
architectural tools and systems proposes any extension toward
validation or verification. This is not to say that they could
not be extended to allow it; for most of them this remains to
be done.
Nevertheless, in the past there has been some attempts to
incorporate some formal tools in the development of robotic
platforms. Some of the requirements presented above were
clearly addressed by a previous version of the LAAS archi-
tecture [12] based on the KHEOPS system [13]. KHEOPS
is a tool for checking a set of propositional rules in real-
time. A KHEOPS program is thus a set of production rules
(condition(s) → action(s)), from which a decision tree is
built. More recently, we have proposed the R2C [14]. The
main component of R2C is the state checker. This component
encodes in an OBDD the constraints of the system, specified
in a language named EXOGEN. At run-time it continuously
checks if new requests are consistent with the current execu-
tion state and the model of properties to enforce.
Another interesting early approach to prove various formal
properties of robotic systems is the ORCCAD system [15].
This development environment, based on the Esterel [16]
language, provides extensions to specify robot “tasks” and
“procedures”. However, this approach remains constrained by
the synchronous systems paradigm.
In [17], the authors present another work related to syn-
chronous languages, which has some similarities with the work
presented here. Their objective is also to develop an execution
control system with formal checking tools and a user-friendly
language. This system makes use of an abstract representa-
tion of services (without explicit representation of arguments
nor returned values). Their development environment allows
the possibility to validate the resulting automata via model-
checking techniques (with Sigali, a Signal extension).
In [18], the authors focus on code verification and certifica-
tion using a theorem prover in high order logic. They illustrate
their approach on the laser based navigation component of a
mobile robot. As we will see, this work is complementary to
ours, as it explicitly focuses on some aspects of verification
(C/C++ code) which we do not handle. But their approach is
somewhat limited to one particular component or algorithm,
and does not manage the interactions between functional
components.
In [19], the authors propose a system based on a model-
based approach. The objective is to abstract the system into
a state transitions based language abstracting the dependabil-
ity concerns. The programmers specify state evolutions with
invariants and a controller executes this maintaining these
invariants. To do that the controller estimates the most likely
current state—using observation and a probabilistic model
of physical components—and finds the most dependable se-
quence of commands to reach specified goal (i.e., with a
minimum failure probability).
In [20], the authors present the CIRCA SSP planner for
hard real-time controllers. This planner synthesizes off-line
controllers from a domain description (preconditions, post con-
ditions and deadlines of tasks). CIRCA SSP can then deduce
the corresponding timed automaton to control the system on-
line, with respect to these constraints. This automaton can be
formally validated with model checking techniques.
In [21], the authors present a system which allows the trans-
lation from MPL (Model-based Processing Language) and
TDL (Task Description Language)—the executive language of
the CLARAty architecture[4]— to SMV, a symbolic model
checker language.
Compared to the approach we propose in this paper, these
three latter works are mostly designed for the specification
of the decisional level and do not address the validation and
verification of the functional level.
More generally, as advocated in [22], an important trend
in modern systems engineering is model-based design, which
relies on the use of explicit models to describe develop-
ment activities and their products. It aims at bridging the
gap between application software and its implementation
by allowing predictability and guidance through analysis of
global models of the system under development. The first
model-based approaches, such as those based on ADA, syn-
chronous languages [23] and Matlab/Simulink, support very
specific notions of components and composition. More re-
cently, modeling languages, such as UML (Unified Modeling
Language) [24] and AADL (Architecture Analysis and Design
Language) [25], attempt to be more generic. They support
notions of components that are independent from a particular
programming language, and put emphasis on system archi-
tecture as a means to organize computation, communication,
and implementation constraints. Component-based techniques
for systems and software have not yet achieved a satisfactory
level of maturity. Systems built by assembling together inde-
pendently developed and delivered components often exhibit
pathological behavior. Part of the problem is that developers
of these systems do not have a precise way of expressing the
behavior of components at their interfaces, where inconsis-
tencies may occur. Components may be developed at different
times and by different developers with, possibly, different uses
in mind. Their different internal assumptions, when exposed
to concurrent execution, can give rise to unexpected behavior,
e.g., race conditions and deadlocks.
All these difficulties and weaknesses are amplified in em-
bedded system design in general. They cannot be overcome,
unless we solve the hard fundamental problems raised by
the definition of rigorous frameworks for component-based
design. Such kinds of frameworks require mathematical foun-
dations that encompass both analytic and computation tech-
niques. They should also possess the ability to cope with het-
erogeneity and constructivity during design, coming from the
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need to integrate components with different characteristics and
to build blocks and glue components with known properties.
BIP differs significantly from existing component-based
frameworks for software engineering. These often use multi-
threaded programming and point-to-point interaction mech-
anisms, such as function calls, for coordination between
components. In contrast, BIP executes atomic components
concurrently and coordinates them in terms of high-level
mechanisms such as protocols and scheduling policies.
Focusing on the organization of computation between com-
ponents, BIP can be viewed as an architecture description
language (ADL). Like other existing ADLs, such as Acme [26]
and Darwin [27], BIP uses the concept of connector to express
coordination between components. Nonetheless, connectors in
BIP are stateless. The architecture, consisting of connectors
and priorities, is clearly distinguished from behavior.
Another significant difference from other frameworks is that
BIP is intended for system modeling. It directly encompasses
timing and resource management. Other system modeling
formalisms either seek generality to the detriment of rigorous-
ness, such as SySML (Systems Modeling Language) [28] and
AADL, or limit their scope to specific computation models,
such as Ptolemy [29].
B. Proposed approach
Developing a functional level using our integrated frame-
work combining the GenoM and BIP technologies consists of
the following steps: (i) developing the functional level using
the GenoM tool of the LAAS architecture; (ii) translating the
GenoM functional level into an equivalent BIP model; (iii)
adding safety constraints into the generated BIP model; and
on one hand (iv) verifying offline the model with the D-
Finder [30] tool in our BIP tool-chain, and on the other hand
(v) using online the BIP model jointly with the BIP engine
to run the robot.
Then, we can summarize the contributions of this paper
as follows. First, we provide algorithms and data structures
for generating from a given GenoM functional level speci-
fication an equivalent BIP functional level. We provide an
implemented tool that can automate this translation process.
Along with the BIP engine, the BIP functional level is used in
place of its GenoM counterpart. Second, we show, using a Mars
exploration scenario, how the user can straightforwardly use
BIP to specify and enforce different kinds of safety constraints
on a generated BIP functional level. Third, we present results
from using D-Finder to incrementally verify the generated BIP
functional level. In particular, we prove that a substantial part
of the BIP functional level is deadlock-free, and we report, for
the first time, experiences in using D-Finder (e.g., solutions to
deadlocks encountered) with a complex, real-world domain.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
the existing LAAS architecture and the BIP tool-chain; in
Section III, we discuss in detail how to generate from a
GenoM functional level an equivalent BIP functional level; in
Section IV, we show how the BIP engine can be used as a
controller of the BIP functional level, in order to prevent the
system from reaching “dangerous” states; in Section V, we
show how D-Finder was used to analyze the BIP functional
level for properties such as deadlocks; in Section VI, we give
experimental results from using D-Finder for the verification
of the BIP functional level, as well as a runtime performance
comparison between the GenoM functional level and the BIP
functional level; and finally, in Section VII, we present our
conclusions and directions for future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. GenoM
As discussed in [31], the lowest level of most complex
systems and robotic architectures is the functional level, which
includes all the basic, built-in action and perception capa-
bilities. These processing functions and control loops (e.g.,
image processing, obstacle avoidance, and motion control) are
encapsulated into controllable, communicating modules. At
LAAS, we use GenoM1 [2] to develop these modules. Each
module in the functional level of the LAAS architecture is
responsible for a particular functionality of the robot. Complex
functionality (such as navigation) is obtained by combining
modules.
For example, the functional level of our Dala rover is shown
in Figure 1. This functional level2 includes two navigation
modes. The first one, for mostly flat terrain, is laser based
(LaserRF), and it builds a map (Aspect) and navigates
using the near diagram (NDD) approach. In particular, (i)
LaserRF acquires laser scans and stores them in the Scan
poster, from which Aspect builds the obstacle map Obs; and
(ii) NDD manages the navigation by avoiding these obstacles
and periodically produces a speed reference (speed) to reach
a given target from the current position Pos produced by POM.
The speed reference produced by NDD is, in turn, used by
RFLEX, which manages the low level robot wheels controller.
RFLEX also produces the current position (Pos) of the robot
based on odometry; this position is used by POM which
manages the current position of the robot, as well as the
various geometrical frame transformations of the robot sensors
(e.g., Laser RF, cameras, and PTU) and effectors. The second
navigation mode, for rough terrain, is vision based, and uses
stereo images (VIAM, Stereo and DTM) to build a 3D map
(Env), which is used as input into an arc based trajectory
planner (P3D). P3D also produces a speed reference (speed)
which can be used by RFLEX. Hueblob, using panoramic im-
ages taken by VIAM, monitors potentially interesting features
in the images, and PTU controls the pan-and-tilt unit (PTU).
Finally, Antenna emulates communication with an orbiter,
and Battery and Heating emulate the management of
the power/energy and temperature (respectively) of the whole
platform.
All these modules are built by instantiating a generic
template (Figure 2). Each module provides services, which
can be invoked by the higher (decisional) level according to
tasks that need to be achieved. Services can be execution
services, which initiate activities that take time to execute,
1GenoM and other tools from the LAAS architecture can be freely down-
loaded from: https://softs.laas.fr/openrobots/wiki/
2Module and poster names in Figure 1 are in the fixed font.
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Fig. 1. The complete architecture of Dala.
or control services, which take negligible time to execute and
are responsible for setting and returning variable values3. For
example, the NDD module provides five services correspond-
ing to initializations of the navigation algorithm (SetParams,
SetDataSource, and SetSpeed), and launching and stopping
the computation of the motion direction toward a given goal
(Stop and GoTo). Execution services are managed by execution
tasks, responsible for launching and executing activities within
the associated running services. Each module may “export”
posters for others (modules or the decisional level) to read,
which store data produced by the module. For example, the
NDD module exports the Speed poster which is periodically
read by the RFLEX module as the speed reference to apply
on the wheels of the robot.
Figure 3 presents the automaton of an activity. Transitions
in the automaton correspond to the execution of particular el-
ementary (C/C++) code, called codels, provided by the devel-
3These variables are stored in a global data structure called Functional-IDS,
which stores the data that is shared by all parts of a module. Similarly, there
is a Control-IDS which stores some data about the internal control variables
of a module.
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Fig. 2. A GenoM module internal organization.
opers. Codels represent the core functionality of activities, and
they are responsible for things such as initializing parameters
(transition from start location), executing the “body” of the
activity or its main codel (transition from exec location), and
safely ending the activity, which may amount to things such as
resetting parameters and sending error signals. As discussed in
[2], the automaton in the figure depicts the following execution
cycle. The activity is initially in the fictitious location ether.
On receiving a request(args), it transitions to the start loca-
tion, during which parameters are checked and other running
incompatible services interrupted. The activity is then started
(location exec), from where it can keep executing (possibly
looping back to this exec state if the execution spans over
more than one cycle), be interrupted or ended. Finally, the
activity returns an appropriate report and transitions back to
location ether.
start
failether
exec
inter
end
request(args)/-
-/exec-/fail
-/fail
-/interrupted
-/failed
abort/-
abort/-
-/OK
abort/-
-/exec
-/end
Fig. 3. The execution automaton of a GenoM activity. Transitions are of the
form input/output.
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B. BIP
BIP [3] is a framework4 for modeling heterogeneous real-
time programs.5 The main characteristics of BIP are the
following:
• BIP supports a model-based design methodology in
which parallel programs are the superposition of three
layers. The lowest layer specifies the behavior (B), the
intermediate layer is a set of connectors specifying the
interactions (I) between transitions of the behavior, and
the upper layer is a set of priority rules (P) describing
scheduling policies for interactions of the layer under-
neath. This layering offers a clear distinction between
behavior and structure (i.e., connectors and priority rules).
• BIP uses a parameterized composition operator on pro-
grams, where the product of two programs is taken as
the composition of their corresponding layers separately.
Parameters are used to define the interactions as well as
new priority rules between the parallel programs [32].
Such a composition operator facilitates incremental con-
struction, i.e., obtaining a parallel program by successive
composition of other programs.
• BIP provides a powerful mechanism for structuring in-
teractions. This is done using strong synchronization and
weak synchronization, where synchronous execution is
characterized as a combination of the properties of the
three layers.
The BIP framework is implemented in the form of a tool-
chain (Figure 4) which provides a complete implementation
and a rich set of tools for things such as modeling, execution,
and analysis (both static and on-the-fly). The tools can be
broadly classified into:
• A front-end for editing and parsing BIP programs, and
for generating an intermediate model. This can be used to
generate code for execution and analysis on a back-end
platform, as well as for static analysis.
• A back-end platform with an engine and the infrastructure
for executing and analyzing the C++ application code,
generated by the front-end.
C. BIP language
The BIP language [3], [33] supports the building of com-
ponents from: (i) atomic components, which are a class of
components in which interaction and priority layers are empty
and behavior is specified as a set of transitions, and where
triggers (labels) of transitions are ports (action names) used
for synchronization; (ii) connectors, for specifying possible in-
teraction structures between ports of atomic components; and
(iii) priority rules, for selecting among possible interactions
according to conditions, whose valuations depend on the state
of the integrated atomic components.
An atomic component consists of: (i) a set of ports
P = {p1, . . . , pn}, where ports are used for synchronization
with other components; (ii) a set of control states/locations
4http://www-verimag.imag.fr/Rigorous-Design-of-Component-
Based.html?lang=en
5Most material in this subsection and the next is based on [3].
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Fig. 4. The BIP tool-chain.
S = {s1, . . . , sk}, which denotes locations at which the
components wait for synchronizations; (iii) a set of variables
V for storing (local) data; and (iv) a set of transitions encoding
atomic computation steps.
A transition is a tuple of the form (s1, p, g, f, s2), repre-
senting a step from control location s1 to s2. A transition’s
execution is an atomic sequence of two microsteps: (i) an in-
teraction including p, which involves synchronization between
components, possibly with an exchange of data; followed by
(ii) an internal computation specified by function f on V . A
transition can be executed only if the guard (boolean condition
on V ) g holds and some interaction including port p is offered.
emptystart full
in out
in, 0 < x, y ← f(x)
out, ,
Fig. 5. A simple BIP atomic component.
Figure 5 shows a simple atomic component. This component
has: two ports in, out; two variables x, y; and two control
locations empty, full. At control location empty, a transition is
possible if an interaction is possible on in and if 0 < x. When
the transition takes place, a new value for y is computed. From
control location full, a transition can occur when an interaction
on out is possible. The omission of the guard and function for
this transition means that the associated guard is true and the
internal computation microstep is empty. 6
An atomic component consists of a declaration of ports
(identifiers) and data followed by the definition of its behavior.
For data, basic C types can be used. In the behavior, the guard
6For legibility, we do not show in the rest of the paper, guards and functions
in figures of BIP components.
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and statement are respectively C expressions and statements.
We assume that these are written with appropriate care to
respect the atomicity assumption for transitions, e.g., no side
effects and guaranteed termination. The behavior is defined
by a set of transitions, where a transition is specified by a
control location, followed by a port identifier, guard, function,
and a target location. The BIP description of the reactive
component of Figure 5 is the following:
component Reactive
port in,out
data int x,y
behavior initial to empty
state empty
on in provided 0 < x do y ← f(x) to full
state full
on out to empty
end
end
Compound components are constructed from a set of atomic
components with disjoint sets of names for ports, control
locations, variables, and transitions. A set of ports that contains
at most one port from each atomic component is called
an interaction. We simplify the notation of an interaction
by writing p1p2p3p4 for the set of ports {p1, p2, p3, p4}. A
connector, denoted by γ, is a set of interactions. For instance,
if p1, p2, and p3 are ports of distinct atomic components, then
the connector γ over {p1, p2, p3} may have seven interactions:
p1; p2; p3; p1p2; p1p3; p2p3; and p1p2p3. Given a connector
γ, there are, as mentioned before, two basic modes of synchro-
nization: (i) strong synchronization (or rendezvous), when the
only feasible interaction of γ is the maximal one, i.e., the
one containing all the ports of γ (i.e., p1p2p3 in the example
above); and (ii) weak synchronization (or broadcast), when
the feasible interactions are all the interactions containing a
particular active port which initiates the broadcast (i.e., if
p1 initiates the broadcast in the above example, the possible
interactions are: p1; p1p2; p1p3; and p1p2p3).
In BIP syntax, a connector specification includes its
set of ports, followed by an optional guarded list of its
feasible interactions, each with an optional behavior. If the
list is omitted, all feasible interactions with respect to the
connector’s set of ports can be unconditionally executed with
no additional behavior execution. For instance, if there are
no on statements specified in the broadcast connector below,
all synchronizations involving appropriate combinations of
ports mentioned in the connector statement can occur. The
behavior specification of a connector, like that of a transition,
is a set of guarded commands associated with feasible
interactions. Specifically, if α = p1p2 . . . pn is a feasible
interaction, then its behavior is described by a statement of
the form: on α provided Gα do Fα, where Gα and Fα are
respectively a guard and a statement representing a function
on the variables of the components involved in the interaction.
An example of the syntax of a connector is given below.
Note that this syntax is a simplified version of the one given
in the BIP literature.
connector conn(c1.p1, c2.p2)
define [c1.p1￿, c2.p2]
on c1.p1,c2.p2
provided g
do {c2.p2.v ← C}
on c1.p1
provided g
do {}
This connector, called conn, is a broadcast connector due
to there being a port–p1–that initiates the broadcast, denoted
by the closed inverted comma next to p1 in the define
statement. Thus, port p1 of component c1 is the initiator of
the broadcast synchronization between ports c1.p1 and c2.p2,
where c2 is a component and p2 is one of its ports. If a
strong synchronization involving both ports can occur, then
a data transfer takes place, i.e., the variable v of port p2 is
assigned the constant C. No synchronization can take place
unless guard g is met.
Finally, a compound component allows defining new com-
ponents from existing sub-components (atoms or compounds)
by creating their instances, and by specifying the connectors
between them and the priorities between connectors. Compo-
nent instances can have parameters for assigning initial values
to their variables through a named association.
D. D-Finder
The D-Finder tool7 implements a compositional [30] and
incremental methodology [34], [35] for the verification of
component-based systems described in the BIP language [3].
D-Finder is mainly used to check safety properties of com-
posite components, particularly useful for checking deadlock-
freedom. To check safety properties, D-Finder applies the
compositional verification method proposed in [30], [34], [35].
In this method, the set of reachable states is approximated by
component invariants and interaction invariants. Component
invariants are over-approximations of the set of the reachable
states of atomic components and are generated by simple
forward propagation techniques. Interaction invariants express
global synchronization constraints between atomic compo-
nents.
When we are concerned with the verification of global
deadlock properties, we let DIS be the set of global states
in which a deadlock can occur. A deadlock is global, meaning
that no interaction is enabled in the deadlock state. Therefore,
DIS can be computed by considering the disabled conditions
of all the interactions. The tool progressively finds and elim-
inates potential deadlocks as follows. D-Finder starts with a
BIP model as input and computes component invariants CI
by using the technique outlined in [30]. From the generated
component invariants, D-Finder computes an abstraction of
the BIP model and the corresponding interaction invariants
II . From the enabled conditions of the interactions, D-Finder
computes global deadlocks DIS. Then, it checks satisfiability
7http://www-verimag.imag.fr/DFinder.html
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of the conjunction II∧CI∧DIS. If the conjunction is unsat-
isfiable, then there is no deadlock. Otherwise, either D-Finder
generates stronger component and interaction invariants or it
tries to confirm the detected deadlocks by using reachability
analysis techniques. When verifying other safety properties
with D-Finder, one of the steps is to replace DIS by the set
of global states in which property violations occur. The other
steps are identical to those of deadlock-freedom checking.
E. BIP engine
The BIP tool-chain provides a platform for executing and
analyzing the C++ application code generated by the front-end.
The tool-chain includes an engine and the associated software
infrastructure. The engine, entirely implemented in C++ on
Linux, directly implements the operational semantics of BIP.
Engine
Interactions
fil
ter
()
Prioritiesevaluate
()
execute()
B1 B2 ··· Bn
init()/notify()
sync()
Fig. 6. The centralized engine architecture.
The engine works based upon the complete state infor-
mation of the components. The execution follows a two-
phase protocol, marked by the execution of the engine, and
the execution of the atomic components. In the execution
phase of the engine, it computes the interactions possible
from the current state of the atomic components, and guards
of the connectors. Then, between the enabled interactions,
priority rules are applied to eliminate the ones with low
priority. During this phase, the components are blocked, and
await to be triggered by the engine. The engine selects a
maximal enabled interaction, executes its data transfer, and
triggers the execution of the atomic components associated
with this interaction. The second phase is the execution of
the local transitions of the notified atomic components. In
our implementation, they continue their local computation
independently in their own thread and eventually reach new
control states. Here, the atomic components notify the engine
regarding their enabled transitions and get blocked once more.
The two phases are repeated, unless a deadlock is reached or
the user wants to terminate the simulation. The scheme of the
protocol is shown in Figure 6.
III. COMPONENTIZATION OF THE GenoM FUNCTIONAL
LEVEL
In this section, we discuss the componentization of the
functional level, i.e., how the functional level is organized
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Fig. 7. A GenoM module BIP componentization.
into a collection of separate modules, each with a specific
functionality and a well-defined interface. In particular, we
discuss our algorithms for mapping a given GenoM functional
level into an equivalent BIP functional level. We start with
the mapping from generic GenoM modules (Figure 2) to their
BIP counterparts. The generic GenoM module is mapped to
a hierarchy of BIP components, as shown in Figure 7. In
addition to representing some GenoM entity, each box in this
figure also represents an atomic or compound BIP component.
In the same way we instantiate the generic GenoM module to
produce a particular GenoM module, we can instantiate the
generic BIP model (of the generic GenoM module) to obtain
the BIP model of a particular module.
In the componentization, an Execution Task is a compound
component consisting of: a Scheduler (atomic) component,
to control the execution of the Activity component of some
Execution Service component; a Task Controller (atomic) com-
ponent to stop the Scheduler if none of its associated Execution
Service components are running; a Timer component to control
the execution period of the Execution Task; and a Permanent
component if the Execution Task has a permanent codel8.
The Poster components are used for exporting the data
stored within the module’s Functional-IDS data structure, and
they provide operations for reading from and writing to this
data. The IDS Lock component represents a semaphore for
ensuring mutual exclusion between different Execution Task
components and Execution Service components when manip-
ulating Poster components. The Timer component (directly)
in the Module component is used by Poster components to
8A permanent codel is executed at each loop of an execution task. It is not
defined nor associated to a particular request.
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determine how much time has elapsed, in terms of “ticks,”
since the last modification to their data. Specifically, Poster
components contain a variable called PosterAge (initially 0)
that is incremented for each “tick” activated by the associated
Timer component, and reset whenever the poster is written to.
The Service Controller, Activity, and Control Task components
are discussed later.
As shown in Figure 7, some of the atomic components are
combined to form compound components such as Execution
Service. This is done by adding the necessary connectors
between the atomic components. In turn, these compound
components are combined using connectors to form the even
more abstract component Module, corresponding to a GenoM
module. By combining components incrementally (or “bottom-
up”) in this way, we have the guarantee that if its constituent
components are proven to be correct (with respect to certain
safety properties), then the resulting compound component is
also correct, provided it is free of deadlocks [35]. The reason
being that the already established safety properties are not
violated by adding stronger interactions over the constituent
components. Checking for deadlock-freedom using D-Finder
is discussed in Section V.
The most important components from those in Figure 7 are
Message Box, Activity, and Service Controller. Each Module
component has, within its Control Task component, a Message
Box component (Figure 8), which represents the interface for
receiving requests for services and sending back replies. The
period with which requests are read is controlled by the Timer
component of the Control Task. There are two approaches for
handling a newly received request in a Message Box: either
(i) reject the request along with a specific report explaining
the reason; or (ii) unconditionally accept the request. The
latter is done via two transitions. The first transition (abtIncbi ,
where bi represents an Execution Service component) is for
implementing aGenoM feature of interrupting certain execution
services (Execution Service components) that are incompatible
with the new request, and the second transition (trigbi) actually
executes the request by interacting with either a Control
Service or an Execution Service component.
Each Execution Service component has one corresponding
Service Controller component (Figure 9), which controls its
execution by, for example, checking the validity of the param-
eters (if any) of the request (e.g., GoTo) associated with the
service, and handling the aborting of the service’s execution.
The Service Controller component has two variables: active
and done, which are both initially false. The execution of
the Service Controller starts via a synchronization with port
trig, which sets active to true, after which the service can be
aborted from any location via synchronization with the abt
port. On the two transitions to location ethr, variable active
is set to false, and variable done is set to true provided the
transition labeled fin (denoting successful completion of the
activity) was taken. Like a GenoM activity, the execution of
the main codel of the Service Controller is initiated by the
exec transition from the exec location. In each location of the
Service Controller the status of the service can be obtained by
synchronizing with the stat port of the component. Note that
Service Controller components belonging to different Module
readchck
giveidleinitstart
stop stpd fini
abtI
chck stop read give trigb1 . . . trigbn
abtIncb1 . . . abtIncbn rejb1 . . . rejbn exit stopped
read
rejb1 , . . . , rejbn , rejStp
give
noMsg chck
abtIncb1 , . . . , abtIncbn
trigb1 , . . . , trigbn
init
stop
err
stopped
chck chck chck
exit
Fig. 8. An (atomic) BIP Message Box component. Transitions with multiple
ports (separated by commas) represent multiple such transitions, each with
one of the ports. Port init initializes the component; chck checks if there is
a new request to service; stop stops the component from serving requests;
and err “kills” the component with an error message if the initialization was
unsuccessful.
components are equivalent except for the code executed during
certain transitions (e.g., the ones labeled ctrl and abt), and
that transitions labeled abt have higher priority than all other
transitions, i.e., whenever a transition labeled abt and some
other transition are both possible, the former is taken instead
of the latter.9
The Activity component (not shown) corresponds to the
GenoM activity automaton shown in Figure 3. This component
waits to be initiated, i.e., for a synchronization between its
start port and the start port of Service Controller, and then
waits for its main execution to begin, i.e., for a synchronization
between its exec port and the exec port of Service Controller.
In particular, this latter synchronization leads, in the Activity
component, to a transition that executes the main codel of the
associated GenoM execution service. The Activity component
is aborted by synchronizing with the abt port of the corre-
sponding Service Controller; this synchronization sets a flag
that prevents the Activity component from executing its main
codel again.
It is worth noting that, unlike its GenoM counterpart, each
BIP Execution Service component has exactly one Service
Controller component, and consequently, a given Execution
Service component cannot have more than one Activity com-
ponent associated with it (and executing concurrently). While
this is indeed limiting, it can be overcome to a certain
extent by defining additional execution service types in the
GenoM module (which yields additional Execution Service
components in the corresponding BIP module) to cater for
the additional activity instances that may be needed at run-
time. For example, when simulating battery usage, there is a
request called StartUsingBattery—which takes the device, e.g.,
9This is necessary to ensure that a request to abort a service is given priority
over, for instance, starting another step in its execution.
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ctrl rprt
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start stat exec abt trig fail fin
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ctrl
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abt, err
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reprt
fail, fin
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inter
stat
stat
stat
stat
reprt
stat, exec stat
Fig. 9. An (atomic) BIP Service Controller component.
camera, as an argument—to register the fact that the device in
question has started to use the battery, and another request
called EndUsingBattery to register the fact that the device
has stopped using the battery. Since this design may result in
multiple GenoM activities at runtime for the execution service
associated with the StartUsingBattery request (specifically, if
multiple devices need to concurrently use the battery), we
instead have multiple requests, such as CameraStartUsingBat-
tery, one for each device that needs to use the battery.
Observe from Figure 8 that, due to the semantics of BIP
components, an interaction involving a trigbi port of aMessage
Box component cannot happen concurrently with an inter-
action involving some other trigbj port of the component.
Similarly, we have added the restriction that no interaction
involving a trigbi port of a Message Box component can
happen concurrently with an interaction involving a trigbj port
of some other Message Box component (belonging to some
other Module component). Without this restriction it would not
be possible to add connectors (as we do later in Section IV)
to guarantee that two services are not triggered concurrently.10
To add this restriction, we use a simple atomic component
which represents a semaphore; its token is obtained by the
read transition of Message Box components, and released by
the give transition of Message Box components. 11
As shown in Figure 10, each port trigbi of a Message Box
component is synchronized via rendezvous with port bi.trig
of Service Controller component bi. All such connectors are
10Note that this restriction does not imply that two arbitrary Service
Controller components cannot be executed concurrently. That is, two Service
Controller components can interact with their corresponding Activity compo-
nents or abort the services at the same time when they have been triggered
respectively by component Message Box.
11More specifically, the semaphore component has two locations; a take
transition from the initial location to the other location, and a give transition
to the initial location from the other location; moreover, for each Message
Box component, a rendezvous connector exists between the Message Box
component’s read transition and the take transition of the semaphore
component, and between the Message Box component’s give transition and
the give transition of the semaphore component.
···
····
···
···
. . .mod2 mod3 modm
. . .
abtIncb2
abtIncb1
rejb1rejb2
abtIncbn
rejbn
msgbx trig
abt
stat
b1
b2
bn
abt
stat
trig
trigb1trigb2
trigbn
abt
stat
trig
mod1
root
Fig. 10. A high-level illustration of exported ports (in grey), and important
connectors within Module components (mod1, . . . ,modm ). Connectors
are between a Message Box (msgbx) and the associated Service Controller
components (b1, . . . , bn ).
exported so that they are “visible” from the root component,
i.e., it is possible to interact with them from the root compo-
nent. The root component in BIP is the top-level (compound)
component that includes all the other components. In our case,
the root component includes all components of the functional
level.
From now on, for convenience, we simply use trigbi to
refer to such an exported connector involving a port trigbi . For
example, the exported port (grey circle) in Figure 10 that is
associated with the connector involving trigb1 is also referred
to as trigb1 . Similarly, for each Service Controller component
bi, the rejbi and abtIncbi ports of the associated Message Box
component, as well as the bi.abt and bi.stat ports of bi are
exported so that it is possible to interact with them from the
root component. As before, from now on we simply use rejbi ,
abtIncbi , bi.abt and bi.stat to refer to these exported ports.
Unlike the other ports shown in Figure 10 (such as abt), by
default, an interaction on each trigbi port is possible due to a
singleton connector with no guard (i.e., a “no-op” connector)
at the root-component level for each trigbi port. On the other
hand, by default, all rejbi , abtIncbi , bi.abt and bi.stat ports are
not executable due to all such ports being left unconnected at
the root-component level.
To ease the integration of BIP in the new framework,
we have developed a tool that automatically produces a BIP
model from a GenoM module description file. Using this tool
we have converted all the GenoM modules in Figure 1 into
their corresponding BIP modules, except for the POM module
whose functionality is only remotely useful in this particular
experiment. Instead of the original GenoM modules, we are
now using the resulting BIP modules within the top-level
(root) BIP component representing the Dala functional level.
Still, if one wants to enforce some safety properties inside
a module (intra-module) or between modules (inter-module),
these constraints have to be explicitly added into individual
9
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BIP modules or into the root BIP component. We discuss
such constraints in the next section.
IV. FUNCTIONAL LEVEL CONTROLLER SYNTHESIS
Since commands to the functional level are sent from the de-
cisional level (Procedural Reasoning System (OPENPRS) [36]
in our case), and programs written for the decisional level may
contain erroneous handcoded procedures, we need to constrain
the functional level to ensure the appropriate/safe execution of
GenoM services. For example, despite what may be encoded in
decisional level procedures, one may want to ensure that there
is never a situation in which too much power is drawn from
the battery, that the speed reference produced by a navigation
mode is “fresh” enough with respect to the sensor data that it
uses, or that the robot does not move when it is taking high
resolution pictures or communicating.
In the previous LAAS architecture, the proper execution of
GenoM services was managed by a centralized controller called
R2C [14], [37]. The purpose of such a controller is to prevent
the system from reaching dangerous states, such as those
mentioned, which could lead to undesirable or catastrophic
consequences. The R2C controller maintains its own model
and global state of the system. For the latter, R2C monitors
all requests sent from the decisional level to the functional
level and all reports sent back from the functional level. If a
request sent to the functional level will lead the system into an
undesirable (or unsafe) state, R2C takes actions to prevent the
state from being reached, such as killing a service or rejecting
the request. Otherwise, R2C allows the request to go through
and the result to be returned.
The R2C state checker encodes the constraints of the
system, specified in a language named EXOGEN. This
language includes a set of predicates such as past(c), which
checks if the last service instance successfully completed
satisfies the constraint c, and predicate in, which checks if the
value of a resource is a member of some given domain. An
example of an EXOGEN specification for the GoTo service of
the NDD module is shown below [37]:
request GoTo(?goal) {
fail {
maintain:
past(LocalizationSet(?mode) with ?mode==STEREO) &&
(!past(StereoStart()) ￿ [StereoStart() < StereoStop()]);
past(LocalizationSet(?mode) with ?mode==GPS) &&
GPSStatus in [0,0.1];
}
}
In this specification, the GoTo service cannot run if the
localization mode is STEREO and either (i) the stereo was
never started, or (ii) the last time it was started precedes the
last time it was stopped; or if the localization mode is GPS and
the GPS reception level is below 10%. If at least one of these
constraints become true then all running instances of GoTo are
stopped. The EXOGEN specifications are used to generate the
state checker, which has a similar structure to OBDDs [38].
The state checker is used to maintain online the desired system
state by, for example, ensuring the proper execution order of
GenoM services.
One of the main differences between the R2C approach
and the BIP approach is that the former merely acts as
a “filter” below the decisional level to enforce constraints
between requests, while relying mostly on the control provided
by GenoM. The BIP model and engine, on the other hand,
go far beyond this by providing a formal and much finer
grained model of the control taking place inside a functional
module, which allows the user to specify finer grained con-
straints on the behavior of functional modules. Moreover, in
our new framework, we have one integrated system with a
single model and single global state, rather than two systems
(GenoM and R2C) with two different models and two (possibly
inconsistent) representations of the global state. Finally, by
using BIP we now have a clearer semantics for constraints
specified as BIP connectors, compared to the semantics of
constraints specified in R2C.
Before discussing how safety constraints can be encoded as
BIP connectors, we first discuss the Mars Rover scenario we
have written for the decisional level using the OPENPRS [36]
executive. We use this scenario to motivate and illustrate our
constraints. Our scenario consists of the rover heating up to
a given temperature, and then exploring a predefined set of
locations, which involves navigating to them and then taking
science pictures at these particular locations. For now, we only
use laser based navigation, via modules LaserRF, NDD and
Aspect, as discussed in Section II-A. In the near future we
plan to completely incorporate vision based navigation, via
modules P3D, DTM and Stereo, into the BIP functional
level and OPENPRS scenario, for example, by adding safety
constraints between these modules and the ability to switch
between the two navigation modes based on environmental
factors, such as whether the robot is on flat terrain (laser
based navigation) or rough terrain (vision based navigation).
After navigating to a location, taking a science picture involves
aligning the high resolution cameras—mounted on the PTU—
to face the surfaces near the left and right front wheels of
the rover. During navigation, the rover continuously monitors
its surroundings for bright red rocks (objects) using the low
resolution panoramic camera mounted on the mast (we call
this opportunistic science). If such a rock is found, the rover
stops navigating, determines if the rock is still within its front
cameras’ visibility area, and then takes a picture of the rock
by aligning the front cameras toward it. The rover transmits all
new images (both high and low resolution ones) to the orbiter
during given visibility windows. Once all locations have been
explored, the rover navigates back to its original location.
Now we can discuss in detail some of the constraints we
have added into the BIP functional level (i.e., root compo-
nent). We split the constraints into intra-module constraints,
i.e., those between services belonging to a single module, and
inter-module constraints, i.e., those between services belong-
ing to two or more modules.
In what follows, ports with suffixes Trigger, Reject, Abort,
Status, and AbortIncompatibleServices are used to represent
(respectively) particular trigb, rejb, b.abt, b.stat, and abtIncb
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ports. Recall from Section III that all of these are exported
ports.
A. Intra-module constraints
In the NDD module, there must be at least one successfully12
completed SetParams (SetParameters) service, and at least
one successfully completed SetSpeed service before a GoTo
service can be triggered. This constraint is to ensure that the
robot does not start moving at an arbitrary (and potentially
dangerous) speed. In what follows, SPS = SetParamsStatus, SSS
= SetSpeedStatus, GT = GoToTrigger, and GR = GoToReject.
connector AllowGoToIfArgsSet(ndd.GT , ndd.SPS, ndd.SSS)
define [ndd.GT , ndd.SPS, ndd.SSS]
on ndd.GT , ndd.SPS, ndd.SSS
provided ndd.SPS.done ∧ ndd.SSS.done
do {}
connector RejectGoToIfArgsNotSet(ndd.GR, ndd.SPS, ndd.SSS)
define [ndd.GR, ndd.SPS, ndd.SSS]
on ndd.GR, ndd.SPS, ndd.SSS
provided ¬ndd.SPS.done ∨ ¬ndd.SSS.done
do {ndd.GR.rep ← PARAMS-OR-SPEED-NOT-SET}
Connector AllowGotoIfArgSet will trigger the GoTo service
when both SetParams and SetSpeed services are successfully
completed. Connector RejectGotoIfArgsNotSet will reject the
request for the GoTo service along with an error message
indicating that either the SetParams or SetSpeed service was
not successfully completed.
B. Inter-module constraints
This section discusses constraints involving multiple
modules. First, pictures should not be taken with any high
resolution camera while the robot is moving, and vice versa,
in order to prevent high resolution pictures from being blurred
(this constraint does not apply to low resolution panoramic
pictures). Hence, we say that moving is “incompatible” with
taking a picture with a high resolution camera. To enforce
this constraint, whenever a new request is received that is
incompatible with a currently executing service, we can
either abort the latter with a specific error message and
execute the new request, or reject the new request with a
specific error message. Below we show an example of the
case where the new request is rejected. In what follows,
note that AcS = AcquireStatus, TSST = TrackSpeedStartTrigger,
and TSSR = TrackSpeedStartReject. We only show the first two
connectors; the other two (i.e., AllowAcquireIfNotMoving and
RejectAcquireIfMoving) are analogous.13
connector AllowMoveIfNotAcquiring(rflex.TSST , viam.AcS)
define [rflex.TSST , viam.AcS]
on rflex.TSST , viam.AcS
12i.e., where the execution of the service returned a nominal report
13Marlin is the camera model, and viamAcParams is a variable that stores
the camera model passed (as a parameter) with the most recent request to
acquire an image.
provided ¬(viam.AcS.active ∧
viamAcParams.bank.id = “Marlin”)
do {}
connector RejectMoveIfAcquring(rflex.TSSR, viam.AcS)
define [rflex.TSSR, viam.AcS]
on rflex.TSSR, viam.AcS
provided viam.AcS.active ∧
viamAcParams.bank.id = “Marlin”
do {rflex.TSSR.rep ← CANNOT-ACQ-AND-MOVE}
Likewise, we have connectors to disallow taking pictures
with the high resolution camera while the PTU is moving, and
vice versa, and connectors also to disallow communication
with an orbiter while moving, and vice versa, to ensure
that communication is not disrupted. The connectors for
the first constraint are similar to those shown above. The
connectors for the second constraint are shown below.
In what follows, TSSA = TrackSpeedStartAbort, CAIS =
CommunicateAbortIncompatibleServices, CT = Communicate
Trigger, and TSSS = TrackSpeedStartStatus. As before, we only
show the first two connectors; the other two are analogous.
connector AllowCommIfNotMoving(antenna.CT , rflex.TSSS)
define [antenna.CT , rflex.TSSS]
on antenna.CT , rflex.TSSS
provided ¬rflex.TSSS.active
do {}
connector AbortMovingToComm(antenna.CAIS, rflex.TSSA)
define [antenna.CAIS￿, rflex.TSSA]
on antenna.CAIS,rflex.TSSA
provided true
do {rflex.TSSA.rep ← CANNOT-COMM-AND-MOVE}
on antenna.CAIS
provided true
do {}
The following connectors prevent the total amount of
power being drawn from the battery at any point in time from
exceeding the power bus capacity.14 This is done by rejecting
new requests to start using the battery. In what follows, SUB
= StartUsingBattery.
connector AllowUseBatt(battery.SUBT)
define [battery.SUBT]
on battery.SUBT
provided FIDS.totalPwr + batterySUBParams.power ≤
batteryInitParams.maxPwr
do {}
connector RejectUseBatt(battery.SUBR)
define [battery.SUBR]
on battery.SUBR
14Recall that the Functional-IDS (FIDS) is a data structure that is accessible
by all parts of a module and that stores data shared by the different parts of a
module. Also, batterySUBParams is a variable that stores the power passed
(as a parameter) with the most recent request to start using the battery.
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provided FIDS.totalPwr + batterySUBParams.power >
batteryInitParams.maxPwr
do {battery.SUBR.rep ← MAX-PWR-EXCEEDED}
Finally, the following connector prevents poster data
produced by certain modules from being used if the data is
not “fresh”; e.g., a speed reference produced by the NDD
module is not “fresh” if it has not been updated for more
than ten ticks. Recall that the PosterAge variable keeps track
of the amount of time that has elapsed since the last time the
associated Poster component was written to.
connector AbtMoveIfPstrNotFresh(rflex.TSSA, ndd.RflexPoster.read)
define [rflex.TSSA, ndd.RflexPoster.read]
on rflex.TSSA, ndd.RflexPoster.read
provided ndd.RflexPoster.read.PosterAge > 10
do {rflex.TSSA.rep ← NDD-POSTER-NOT-FRESH}
From the constraints presented in this section, it is clear that
the BIP language provides a natural syntax for encoding non-
trivial constraints on certain aspects of BIP components. Such
constraints are fundamental for synthesizing a safe controller
of the functional level. To make it even more convenient for the
user, we have developed a higher-level language for specifying
constraints;15 these are then automatically translated into BIP
connectors, such as those shown in this section. Examples of
constraints in this new language are “r1 before r2,” which
guarantees that request r2 is executed only after the successful
execution of request r1, and “r1 does not overlap r2,” which
guarantees that there is no point in time in which both r1 and
r2 are executing.
V. VERIFICATION WITH D-FINDER
Connectors like those shown in the previous section could
cause deadlocks in the functional level, since they amount to
adding tighter constraints to certain subsets of components. To
check whether the additional connectors may cause deadlocks,
and to determine whether (atomic and compound) components
by themselves are free of deadlocks, we use D-Finder to first
verify atomic components and to then incrementally verify the
compound components resulting from their composition.
A. Intra-module verification
We first discuss results from the verification we carried out
for compound components corresponding to individual GenoM
modules. We start with a deadlock found while verifying the
NDD (Module) component with D-Finder.
Figure 11 shows some of the components and associated
connectors of the NDD component. Observe that there are three
Timer components, one for the Control Task component, one
for the Execution Task component, and one for the Poster
component. A Timer consists of two ports. Port tick can be
synchronized with other components (e.g., timers) to count the
elapsed time before it reaches certain value. Port trigger will
trigger some events when the elapsed time in terms of “ticks”
15This work is currently being published.
reaches a certain amount, and reset the counter. To ensure that
the duration between two contiguous tick synchronizations in
a Timer component is equivalent to such a duration in any
other Timer component, we strongly synchronize all tick ports
of the mentioned Timer components with the tick port of
the MasterTimer component. This component is the “global
clock,” which will effectively ensure that there are at least 10
milliseconds (ms) between two contiguous synchronizations
involving all these tick ports.16
Although this design seemed correct, we found a non-
trivial deadlock while verifying the NDD component with D-
Finder. Intuitively, the reason for this deadlock is the strong
synchronization between the Timer in Control Task and the
Timer in Execution Task. Specifically, the deadlock scenario
identified was the following: the Message Box is in location
abtI ; the Scheduler is in location idle; Execution Services
SetParams and GoTo have started executing and they are
respectively in locations exec and abrt ; variable t in the
Timer of the Execution Task (ExecTaskTimer) has been reset
to zero; and variable t in the Timer of the Control Task
(InterfaceTimer) has reached the maximal value. Recall that,
like all Timer components, the InterfaceTimer simply makes
the trigger port available when the “ticks” reach a predefined
value.
The deadlock was caused by a cyclic-waiting of events
(interactions) between two timers and the related components.
Roughly speaking, InterfaceTimer waits for Message Box;
Message Box waits for some event indirectly controlled by
Scheduler; Scheduler waits for the trigger from ExecTask-
Timer; and ExecTaskTimer waits for InterfaceTimer’s trigger
to continue the “tick.”
More precisely, in this scenario, Scheduler is waiting to
synchronize with the trigger port of ExecTaskTimer in order
to start the next round of execution; ExecTaskTimer is waiting
for variable t in InterfaceTimer to be reset (via the synchro-
nization involving its trigger port) in order to continue with
the synchronization between the four connected tick ports;
InterfaceTimer is waiting forMessage Box to return to location
idle via location give, so that the InterfaceTimer can reset
its variable t and perform the synchronization with the four
connected tick ports; and Message Box, after having aborted
the GoTo service, is waiting to trigger the Stop service, in
order to return to location idle via location give (see Figure 8).
However, it is not possible to trigger the Stop service because,
according to our mapping from GenoM to BIP, no condition on
the transition corresponding to any trigbi port in the Message
Box component will be met. Specifically, this is because the
SetParams and GoTo services have already started executing,
and all other services in the NDD module have been declared
by the user as being incompatible with at least one of these
services. Consequently, a deadlock state has been reached.
Since the deadlock was caused by the cyclic-waiting
between the two timers and the related components, we had
16More than 10 ms may be taken if at least one of the Timer components
takes time to complete their trigger synchronizations. Waiting for 10 ms is
implemented using the usleep system call. There is ongoing work [39] to
extend BIP with the ability to model time, which will remove the need for
the system call and improve the accuracy of measuring time.
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Fig. 11. A deadlock scenario caused by synchronization between Timer components. Dotted lines stand for ignored locations and transitions.
to break the cycle. Our solution was to modify the connector
synchronizing the tick ports to allow InterfaceTimer to not
participate in the synchronization via the connector if it
cannot participate. In precise terms, we have replaced the
strong synchronization between the Timer components in
Figure 11 with two new connectors, of which the first is
shown below.
connector ModuleSync(execTaskTimer.tick, posterTimer.tick,
interfaceTimer.tick)
define [execTaskTimer.tick, posterTimer.tick]￿,
interfaceTimer.tick
export port Port moduleTick
The above connector, exported as moduleTick, executes
a strong synchronization between the three tick ports if the
tick port of the InterfaceTimer component is available, and
otherwise, the connector executes a strong synchronization
only between the tick ports of the ExecTaskTimer component
and PosterTimer component. This solves the deadlock because
it allows the Timer components inside the Module component
to continue executing even if the Message Box component is
waiting for a service to be aborted. The second connector is
shown below.
connector InterModuleSync (masterT imer.tick,moduleT ick1,
. . . ,moduleT ickn)
define masterTimer.tick, moduleT ick1, . . . ,moduleT ickn
on masterTimer.tick, moduleT ick1, . . . ,moduleT ickn
provided true
do {}
The above connector is for global synchronization between
all Module components contained in the functional level,
where {moduleT icki}1≤i≤n is a set of connectors of type
ModuleSync, one for each Module component in the functional
level composed of n Module components.
B. Inter-module verification
Even after correcting individual modules with respect to
deadlocks, it is still possible for collections of modules to
contain deadlocks or to exhibit unsafe behavior. In this section,
we discuss some of the more interesting results from our
analysis of groups of modules for deadlock-freedom and “data
freshness.”
Consider once again the two connectors described above,
which synchronized all the Module components in the func-
tional level by synchronizing a single MasterTimer component
with the associated Timer components of all Control Task,
Execution Task, and Poster components. As one might expect,
with such a complex synchronization there may be the risk
of a deadlock if any of the Timer components cannot per-
form a tick transition due to its trigger port never becoming
available after the Timer’s period is reached. Interestingly, we
successfully verified using D-Finder that the synchronization
between the Timer components belonging to NDD, Aspect
and LaserRF modules are deadlock-free, and moreover, that
the synchronization between the Timer components of NDD
and RFLEX are also deadlock-free.
Finally, we verified the “data freshness” property discussed
in Section IV-B. Recall that this property requires data in
posters to be below a certain user-specified age, given in
terms of “ticks.” Figure 12 shows the components and as-
sociated connectors between the Aspect module (compo-
nents and connectors within the left dashed box) and the
NDD module (components and connectors within the right
dashed box). Observe the two connectors InterModuleSync
and PermStartRead , which respectively synchronizes the
Timer components belonging to certain different modules, and
connects ports of component PolarPoster in module Aspect
and those of components Permanent, Scheduler and Lock in
module NDD, in order to allow NDD to take into account the
PosterAge variable of PolarPoster. Observe also the con-
straint PosterAge < 5 on connector PermStartRead , which
prevents NDD from reading the data stored in PolarPoster if
the data is older than or equal to 5.17
17Observe from Figure 12 that for every increment of PosterAge in
PolarPoster there are five additional ticks in PosterTimer.
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Fig. 12. Deadlock scenario with data-freshness constraint.
In this design, D-Finder detected a deadlock caused by
the PermStartRead connector. This deadlock is illustrated in
Figure 12. Specifically, the deadlock scenario identified was
the following.18 For the Aspect module, the Message Box
component is in location fini , the Scheduler component is in
location stpd ; the PolarPoster component is in location idle
with PosterAge = 5; variable t in the PosterTimer component
is reset to zero; and variable t in the ExecTaskTimer component
is 3. For the NDD module, the Message Box component is in
location abtI ; the Scheduler component is in location perm;
the Permanent component is in location sleep; the GoTo and
Init components are respectively in locations exec and abrt ;
variable t in PosterTimer is reset to zero; and variable t in
ExecTaskTimer is 10.
Intuitively, the reason for the deadlock is as follows. When
PosterAge = 5, PermStartRead cannot be executed causing
components Scheduler and Permanent to be blocked. Because
Scheduler interacts with its timer and other execution services,
the related components and Message Box in module NDD,
as well as the MasterTimer component are blocked. Conse-
quently, module Aspect is also blocked.
The detailed reason for this deadlock is as follows. First,
since PosterAge = 5 holds, the constraint on PermStartRead
disallows an interaction with this connector, resulting in Sched-
uler and Permanent components being blocked. Consequently,
since t = 10 and (due to Scheduler being blocked) an
interaction is not possible with the trigger (and hence tick) port
of the NDD module’s ExecTaskTimer component, an interaction
is also not possible via the InterModuleSync connector.
This entails that all the Timer components of the Aspect
module are blocked. Moreover, since the Aspect module
has stopped after completing the execution of its services, the
whole module is blocked. Finally, since both Init and GoTo
components are executing, no condition on the transition from
location abtI in the Message Box component of NDD will be
met (for reasons explained previously in the first deadlock’s
discussion), resulting in the Message Box having to wait for
18Note that the components’ locations in Figure 12 could be reached if Init
is triggered first, GoTo is triggered after the successful completion of Init, and
then Init is again triggered soon after GoTo but aborted almost immediately.
the termination of Execution Service Init or GoTo, which are
both blocked due to the blocked Scheduler. Consequently, a
(global) deadlock state has been reached.
We tried to resolve this deadlock by adding a connector to
abort the GoTo component of NDD whenever the data of the
Aspect module is not fresh, as follows:
connector GoToAbortNonFreshData (Scheduler.permanentexec,
Permanent.exec, PolarPoster.read, NDDLock.take, GoTo.abort)
define Scheduler.permanentexec, Permanent.exec,
PolarPoster.read, NDDLock.take, GoTo.abort
on Scheduler.permanentexec, Permanent.exec, PolarPoster.read,
NDDLock.take, GoTo.abort
provided PolarPoster.read.PosterAge ≥ 5
do {}
However, we still obtained via D-Finder a deadlock
scenario similar to the above. The only difference was that
GoTo was in location abrt instead of in location exec,
from where port abort is not available. The solution to this
deadlock was to abort GoTo only in situations where (i) NDD
is accessing the non-fresh data from PolarPoster, and (ii)
GoTo is actually executing. The modified connector is shown
below.
connector GoToAbortNonFreshData (Scheduler.permanentexec,
Permanent.exec, PolarPoster.read, NDDLock.take, GoTo.abort)
define [Scheduler.permanentexec, Permanent.exec,
PolarPoster.read, NDDLock.take]￿, GoTo.abort
on Scheduler.permanentexec, Permanent.exec, PolarPoster.read,
NDDLock.take, GoTo.abort
provided PolarPoster.read.PosterAge ≥ 5
do {}
on Scheduler.permanentexec, Permanent.exec, PolarPoster.read,
NDDLock.take
provided PolarPoster.read.PosterAge ≥ 5
do {}
Note that unlike the deadlock illustrated in Figure 11, the
deadlock between the NDD and Aspect modules is not caused
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solely by connectors involving tick ports: it is caused by an
overly-restrictive condition on an interaction. The fact that the
interaction is not possible also blocks the execution of other
interactions, including those involving tick ports. Hence, the
deadlock would still be present even if we remove the explicit
timing connectors and, for instance, use real-time “clocks” in
components such as Message Box and Scheduler, which we
have done in more recent work.19
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The time taken to generate a BIP module from a GenoM
module is negligible. Table I shows the time taken for comput-
ing invariants for the deadlock-freedom checking of thirteen
modules and a group of modules by D-Finder. Module stands
for names of modules; Component stands for the total number
of atomic components in a module; Locations stands for the
total number of control locations in a module; Interactions
stands for the total number of interactions in a module; States
stands for the total number of states in a module—including
those in its constituent components; LOC stands for the num-
ber of lines of (BIP) code in a module; and Minutes stands
for the time taken by D-Finder to return a result. Observe
from the table that we were able to check for the deadlock-
freedom of all our (single) modules in reasonable amounts of
time, even for those consisting of thousands of lines of BIP
code. This shows that D-Finder can be used to verify complex,
real-world domains, and not just toy examples as shown in
previous work [40]. It was already shown in [40], [34], [35]
that the component sizes handled by D-Finder are far beyond
those that can be handled by other state of the art academic
verification tools such as NuSMV [41] and SPIN [42]. Initially,
the deadlock-freedom checking of certain groups of modules
(namely, the three modules LaserRF, Aspect and NDD, and
the two modules NDD and RFLEX) took over 40 minutes,
which was expected considering the large state spaces of the
two groups. However, with a recently improved version of the
D-Finder tool [43], we were able to confirm within a matter
of a few minutes that the synchronization between all the five
related Module components shown in the table were deadlock-
free.
The runtime performance of BIP and GenoM is shown in
Table II. The results shown are the CPU time taken by each
module, obtained via the TIME+ column of the top unix
command. The results are an average over five runs, on a
machine with 1 GB of RAM, and two Intel Pentium 4, 3.06
GHz CPUs with 512 KB of cache on each. To have a fair
comparison between GenoM and BIP, no safety constraints
were included in the BIP model, and no red rocks (objects)
were in the vicinity.20 The experiment conducted was simpler
than the one introduced in Section IV in that the rover only
explored a single location, rather than multiple locations,
before returning back to the initial location. For a more
19In fact, we also found another (albeit trivial) deadlock in the Antenna
module that was not related to tick ports, but had to do with obtaining a “lock”
for a component (via the IDS Lock component) but then never releasing that
“lock.”
20Note that the Hueblob module was still used to continuously search for
red rocks.
complex and complete experiment, we invite the reader to
check the video online: http://db.tt/H4oRLva (please
download it to see it in full resolution and with the proper
captions). It shows a complete experiment with the Dala rover
running the functional level (see Figure 1) in BIP, with various
fault injections leading the BIP engine to prevent them and
report them to the decisional level (OpenPRS in this case),
which takes corrective actions.
Independent samples t-tests confirmed that the differences
between the values in the two columns of Table II are
statistically significant, with P-values of 0.00065 or lower.21
From the results, we can see that the total time taken by
the BIP modules is 27927 time units, whereas the total time
taken by the GenoM modules is 2731 time units. Hence, BIP
took approximately ten times more CPU time than GenoM.
Likewise, in terms of the usage of the CPUs immediately
before the end of the experiments, the GenoM experiment used
approximately ten times less than the BIP experiment, with an
average usage of 6.3% for the former and 52% for the latter.
This additional overhead with BIP comes from the decision
making by the BIP engine. In particular, the BIP engine
actively computes all the feasible interactions at every cycle,
where the time taken for this computation is proportional to
the number of interactions in the BIP modules. This explains
why the RFLEX and VIAM modules are two of the slowest and
the Antenna and Heating modules are two of the fastest.
The number of interactions, however, is not the only factor
that affects the speed of modules. Currently, the BIP engine
runs continuously without halting, even when there are no
interactions to fire. As a result, it uses all the CPU it can get;
simply forcing the BIP engine’s main loop to run at 25 Hz
divides the CPU load by two. Another possible improvement
is to be smarter about the guards which are evaluated at each
loop, e.g., to only check those in which the associated variable
values have changed. As discussed in Section II-E, from the
feasible interactions computed, priority rules are applied to
select one interaction, the data transfer of the interaction is
performed, and transitions on atomic components are executed.
Despite the CPU overhead incurred by using BIP, the time
taken to run the complete experiment was approximately four
and half minutes on average in both GenoM and BIP, with
BIP taking about four seconds longer on average. Therefore,
the overhead in using BIP was negligible when taking into
account the total time for executing the mission. This is most
likely because in the BIP experiment the CPUs are used
at a much higher capacity (52% usage) than in the GenoM
experiment (6.3% usage), which would compensate for the
extra CPU time needed by the BIP modules. The additional
CPU time required by BIP was also perhaps mitigated by the
time taken up in executing actions in the real world, such as
moving the robot, communicating, and moving the PTU. In
our experiments, simply moving Dala from (x, y) coordinates
(0, 0) to (4, 0) takes approximately 30 seconds, moving the
21Specifically, the P-values for the two (five-member) sets of runtime results
from the top row (LaserRF) to the bottom row (VIAM) are respectively as
follows: 2.31 × 10−6, 2.07 × 10−11, 2.00 × 10−7, 1.83 × 10−11, 6.53 ×
10−4, 4.23×10−10, 7.16×10−8, 4.27×10−10, 8.07×10−7, and 1.09×
10−11.
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TABLE I
RESULTS FOR DEADLOCK-FREEDOM CHECKING.
Module Components Locations Interactions States LOC Minutes
LaserRF 43 213 202 220 × 329 × 34 4353 1:22
Aspect 29 160 117 217 × 323 3029 0:39
NDD 27 152 117 222 × 314 × 5 4013 8:16
RFLEX 56 308 227 234 × 335 × 1045 8244 9:39
Antenna 20 97 73 212 × 39 × 13 1645 0:14
Battery 30 176 138 222 × 317 × 5 3898 0:26
Heating 26 149 116 217 × 314 × 145 2453 0:17
PTU 37 174 151 219 × 322 × 35 8669 0:59
Hueblob 28 187 156 212 × 310 × 35 3170 5:42
VIAM 41 227 231 210 × 36 × 665 5099 4:14
DTM 34 198 201 228 × 320 × 95 4160 13:42
Stereo 33 196 199 227 × 320 × 95 3591 13:20
P3D 50 254 219 213 × 35 × 54 × 629 6322 3:51
LaserRF+ Aspect + NDD +
RFLEX + Antenna 171 926 732 2.9× 1090 21284 5:05
TABLE II
GenoM AND BIP RUNTIME PERFORMANCE. A TIME UNIT IS ONE HUNDREDTH OF A CPU SECOND.
Module GenoM execution time BIP execution time
LaserRF 120 1947
Aspect 192 2362
NDD 43 2009
RFLEX 168 10763
Antenna 56 1102
Battery 69 1219
Heating 92 1029
PTU 126 2394
Hueblob 690 1850
VIAM 1046 3225
PTU toward the left or right front wheels of the rover takes
approximately 5 seconds, and transmitting a single picture to
the orbiter also takes approximately 5 seconds.
Thus, this experiment indicates that the code generated
from BIP models can be run on realistic robotic platforms
such as Dala, even those with only modest processing power
and memory capacities. While we acknowledge that certain—
perhaps smaller—robotic platforms with more stringent pro-
cessing power and memory capacities may not be able to
handle the additional CPU overhead in using BIP, we also
note that many of the newer robots have multi-core or many-
core CPUs, and much higher memory capacities than Dala.
Moreover, with the possible improvements to BIP already
mentioned, we expect code corresponding to BIP models to
have a significantly lower overhead on robotic hardware.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that software has become a large part of
robot development, one must admit that the software models
used up to now are either too coarse, too high level, or
too large and thus very difficult to analyze and verify. We
propose a novel approach for developing functional levels
of robotic systems, which incorporates a component-based
design approach (BIP) in an existing architectural tool for
developing functional modules (GenoM). Our approach allows
the synthesis of a controller that is correct by construction
that encodes and enforces designer-supplied safety properties.
Moreover, we use the D-Finder tool to formally verify that
a significant part of our functional level is deadlock-free,
and that it conforms to other safety properties such as data
freshness.
We were able to run experiments with a complete functional
and decisional level on the Dala rover, and to demonstrate via
fault injections that the BIP engine successfully stops the robot
from reaching undesired/unsafe situations like those discussed
previously, and that it reports faults appropriately to the
decisional level. In terms of runtime performance, experiments
show that by using our integrated BIP framework, instead of
using GenoM alone, the CPU time taken is approximately ten
times more than that taken by GenoM alone, mainly because
the BIP engine must compute all the feasible interactions at
each step in its execution. Nonetheless, our robotic platform
was able to handle this additional overhead, and the overall
time taken for the mission was not affected by it.
We plan to extend our work in various directions: e.g., a
real-time BIP engine to take into account wall clock proper-
ties, and a distributed engine to distribute it over more than one
CPU. Another more ambitious research direction is to study
the use of the BIP approach at the decisional level of our
autonomous robot.
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